Email verification over an unencrypted channel
Low
Vulnerability Details
Hey guys,
When registered for an account, the confirmation email sent out, has a http link (refer the attachment) and allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to take over the account. He can do the following:
- Obtain the confirmation tokens while transmitting to the weblate infra and redirect the user to a fake site.
- On clicking the link, the user is auto logged in to the account. The attacker can take over the account if he obtains the tokens in the transmission.
**Steps to reproduce:**
- Navigate to https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/register/
- Fill up the form and submit
- Open the email inbox
- See the link contains http://. Verify both the visible text as well as the actually link is http://.
- Note that all other links are http:// too
**Suggested Fix:**
- Change the confirmation link sent through the email, to *https://*. Both the text visible as well as the actual link.
- Avoid automatic logging into the account when the link is clicked. Display a message saying *Your account is verified. Please login to continue.
**Affected area:** https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/register/
Actions
View on HackerOneReport Stats
- Report ID: 224287
- State: Closed
- Substate: resolved
- Upvotes: 3