Username and Access Token Disclousure

Disclosed: 2020-03-01 11:22:19 By jannikg To nextcloud
Low
Vulnerability Details
Versions ===================== Nextcloud Server Version: 16.0.3.0 it.tsweb.Nextcloud (iOS App) Version: 2.23.7 Description ===================== While logging in to an owncloud instance the iOS client sends the Username and password to the ressource `/login?redirect_url=/login/flow/grant` and recieves an token by the ressource /login/flow in the process. This happens in the form of an HTTP 303 redierect Location [Picture 1]. `/login/flow/grant?clientIdentifier=&stateToken=ji76VUQooqEHFwIPyUUHkAqGaazB8XJ5DHQiJK6vk5aBLfhS1XMf2flTMPVxgFm3` This Token is from now on used to authenticate every request made by the App to the owncloud instance [Picture 4]. This happens in the form of an Basic-Authentication header, where username and password are encodet in an Base-64 String [Picture 3]. Additionally the iOS client automaticaly registers some user specific parameters at `push-notifications.nextcloud.com` without notifying the user. While this process the client also sends the Basic-Authentication header of the owncloud instance to the third Party server [Picture 2]. ## Impact This leads to an massive user information disclousure which affects all iOS users of the nextcloud App (i have not tested Android) to the third party `push-notifications.nextcloud.com`. The owner of the domain and the operator of the server recieve a high ammount of valid Usernames an access tokens of every owncloud instance with iOS users.
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Report Stats
  • Report ID: 672623
  • State: Closed
  • Substate: resolved
  • Upvotes: 20
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